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| 2 | IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA |
| 3 | RICHMOND DIVISION |
| 4 | JAMES JENKINS, on behalf of |
| 5 | himself and all other similarly) situated individuals |
| 6 | v.) Criminal No. |
| 7 | EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC) |
| 8 |) June 14, 2016 |
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| 11 | COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE M. HANNAH LAUCK |
| 12 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |
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| 14 | APPEARANCES: |
| 15 | Leonard A. Bennett, Esquire Consumer Litigation Associates |
| 16 | 763 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A Newport News, Virginia 23601 |
| 17 | Kristi C. Kelly, Esquire |
| 18 | Kelly & Crandall PLC 4084 University Drive, Suite 202A |
| 19 | Fairfax, VA 22030 |
| 20 21 | Lauren K.W. Brennan, Esquire Francis & Mailman PC Land Title Building |
| 22 | 100 S. Broad Street, Suite 1902 Philadelphia, PA 19110 |
| 23 | Counsel for the Plaintiffs |
| 24 | DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR |
| 25 | OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
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       APPEARANCES: (Cont.)
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       Phyllis B. Sumner, Esquire
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      King & Spalding
1180 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
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 4
                 Counsel for the Defendant Equifax
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(The proceedings in this matter commenced at 1 2 10:40 a.m.) 3 THE CLERK: Civil action 3:15CV443, James 4 5 Jenkins, et al. versus Equifax Information Services, 6 LLC. 7 Mr. Leonard Bennett, Ms. Kristi Kelly, and Ms. Lauren Brennan represent the plaintiffs. Ms. 8 9 Phyllis Sumner represents the defendant. 10 Are counsel ready to proceed? 11 MR. BENNETT: The plaintiffs are, Your Honor. 12 MS. SUMNER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 13 Thank you. THE COURT: 14 MR. BENNETT: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 it please the Court: 16 We're here today to ask the Court to 17 preliminarily approve a proposed class settlement 18 negotiated on behalf of a putative class of nationwide 19 consumers who allege that Equifax, a consumer 20 reporting agency, violated 15 U.S. Code 1681g(a), 21 which requires a consumer reporting agency to fully 22 identify the sources of its information. 23 In this case, Your Honor, the source of the 24 information that was challenged was LexisNexis, a

private vendor, that reported the public record

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information in consumer credit reports.

The class is gigantic. It would consist of everyone during the statute of limitations period who requested a copy of their consumer file. It would be anywhere between one and two and a half million by our estimations - two million is the rough estimate I'll use in this discussion - which means that a class action that proceeded to seek money damages for a willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act would entitle consumers, if we were successful, to somewhere between \$200 million at a minimum at \$100 a class member to \$2 billion, which would dwarf the net worth of this company. And, of course, that's not counting putative damages.

In this case, that caused us to shift from our customary common fund method of negotiating to one that focused on correcting the problem. It meant because we expected in the negotiation we would not be able to force a cash fund for class members the class members should not have to give up their claims.

In this case, we faced - I say this not just publicly now that we've shaken hands, but beforehand as well - as formidable a defense team as we can.

The Equifax defense lawyers know the weaknesses. They know the challenges. They know the challenges. They

pressed the buttons in the settlement discussions regarding the proof of willfulness, the fact that the breadth of the class, and the fact that Equifax -- shifting to the carrot and the stick, the carrot arguments from Equifax were: This would fix the problem. This would give consumers actual monetary value in the form of, as I'll detail in a moment, the credit monitoring, the retail product, and this would serve as the catalyst for industry change both in the courtroom, as we are suing Equifax's competitors for the same class, essentially, as well as in industry practice.

That caused us -- it certainly didn't short circuit our negotiation cycle. We had multiple mediations both before retired Eleventh Circuit Judge Birch and directly before we could agree on much of anything. The settlement agreement was negotiated down to the last word, the letter, the notice, the choice of administrator. That's a broad conclusion.

The summary of the case, Judge, is that this is a settlement that would not release anything other than the ability to bring this specific claim on a class basis. It would pay every single class member 18 months of a product that is retail sold, not contrived, for roughly \$15, and it would reform

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Equifax's reporting and disclosure practices so that every consumer who gets a report going forward would know the source of that information. It's an important term because the source of the information has its own set of responsibilities. LexisNexis is liable under different sections of the Fair Credit Report Act, that consumers can contact the vendor who may have mistakenly reported a judgment as unsatisfied. A bankruptcy -- in my case, I had TransUnion reported a bankruptcy on Leonard Bennett's credit report ages ago. Michael C. Bennett, a gentleman, a lawyer up in Pennsylvania. And certainly the firms that represent the putative class here, Judge, have represented, besides Leonard Bennett, countless, hundreds, thousands of consumers in an individual basis who had public records that were inaccurately attributed to them.

It would empower consumers. Even if we get to fairness and the Court denies approval, every class member will have been told in this process by a notice of the fact pattern that's at issue here so that every class member will now know, all these individuals who requested their file, that LexisNexis was the real source of the public records at issue in the case.

At this stage, of course, Judge, there's no

opposition. The standard of preliminary approval is low, but the basic law requires the Court to agree that the case can be certified.

Typically, on preliminary approval or any settlement approval of a class, the Court emphasizes or looks at the Rule 23(a) factors, numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy the same way Your Honor would look at it if it was contested. But the law is that the 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) elements are -- the Court has more flexibility so that we don't need to prove that we can manageably present the evidence at trial, for example.

We do need to prove that the class is numerous. It is. It's millions. We do need to prove that there are common issues. And here the claims are common. The allegation of the incorrectness of the source, the failure to disclose it, the allegation that this was illegal under 1681g(a), and that the conduct was willful on all common issues. We've cited some of the cases; Dreher v. Experian, Soutter v. Equifax. The law in this district is pretty well established there.

Typicality. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Soutter that initially reversed and remanded before

Judge Payne held that you need to explain that we need

to have facts that establish the named plaintiffs' claims that are typical of those of the class. And that's very simple here. Requested the file. Had a public record in it. The source, LexisNexis, was withheld or not disclosed. The fact pattern here, the facts to establish the named plaintiffs' claims, are typical of those for the class.

Inadequacy. All of these plaintiffs have been with us for quite a long time, even before we filed the cases. This was a project that's been going on for a while. They have been responsive. They vetted and actually approved the specific settlement before we could negotiate its terms to completion.

The counsel in this case, I have and my firm has considerable experience in this court and otherwise, but behind me also sit, Your Honor, attorneys for two of the three best Fair Credit Reporting Act firms in the country. If I can introduce Lauren --

MS. BRENNAN: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. BENNETT: -- who is with Francis &

Mailman. Was my business rival for quite some time

until now we've decided it's better to help class

members together, but in Philadelphia they have been

doing this as long and as effectively as we have. If the jurisprudence out there is not ours, it's theirs.

The fact pattern for this case began ages ago in a case styled $Dennis\ v.\ TransUnion.$ That was their win.

Your Honor has already, I think, met Kristi Kelly, who is winning all kinds of accolades and quickly pushed Consumer Litigation Associates out as the big firm in Virginia. We're now the old graying quy who hopes that she'll keep us around.

There is no comparable team, without exaggeration, I could have put together that would be as effective at litigating these cases, and I think that that certainly, both the unity and the competence, satisfies adequacy, and it's proven by the fact that we are able to negotiate this particular deal.

We've proposed a class notice. We have tried to reduce some expenses here, but the notice, as we discussed at a 16(b) status update, Your Honor, is a hybrid notice where we will send to electronically verified email addresses. A number of individuals requested their file and communicate with Equifax via Internet and using a communication domain that will avoid spam blocks and that will show as an Equifax

associated communication the way that the previous communications with the class member took place. That's a percentage. That's a minority. A significant percentage but a minority of the class members. And the others, we actually have a direct notice plan. And that's expensive given the size of the class, and that was a big hold up that held us up from getting to Your Honor our proposed settlement terms on our original schedule.

Either way, it's direct notice. We are not relying on a one-inch ad in the back of a *USA Today* newspaper. And we have a top flight class administrator that will run the settlement.

The data from Equifax as to class members is pretty airtight. Frankly, when you sue a company such as Equifax, that's the source for a lot of the credit header information, the identifying information that if we were to sue Bank of America, we would rely on. That is, the class administrator would buy from Equifax class member, credit header, or credit history information, identifying information.

In this case, we have it directly from the CRA's mouth, so to speak. And so the notice will be as effective as possible and will certainly satisfy Rule 23(c).

The release is narrow. We don't yet have to convince Your Honor that the ungodly amount of attorneys' fees that we always seek are justified, but we will. I can answer questions about that, but we will brief it substantially after class members have had a say, unless the Court suggests otherwise. And, of course, this is an amount that the Court has to approve. It was negotiated after settlement. Entirely after settlement. And it is only paid by Equifax, which in Berry v. LexisNexis, the Fourth Circuit, as well as this court with Judge Spencer, found appropriate and important.

I don't have any other questions for Your Honor unless you have any questions for me.

THE COURT: I do have questions. I just want to be clear. You have submitted this proposed class both under (b)(2) and (b)(3). The proposed order, which is always helpful for me to review, suggests only a (b)(3) certification, and I really want to hear from both of you about exactly what you're seeking and why, which class you think is most appropriate to certify under and why.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, as a practical matter, it is because one lawyer made the final edits in one document and not in the other. That's me. And

so I did not add the 23(b)(2) term into the proposed order, and I would ask to be able to do that. It's a mistake that I have only now learned that I committed.

THE COURT: So you're seeking certification under both?

MR. BENNETT: Under both. But it's unnecessary to seek it under both. The biggest difference between a 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) from a practical standpoint is the ability to opt out and the need for direct notice. And the law is that with Rule 23(b)(2) settlements you don't have to provide an opt out. It doesn't violate due process because it is injunctive relief that affects the class as a whole, and it is, in addition to that, direct notice, therefore it's not important because there's no need to opt out. The direct notice is cosmetic.

That doesn't mean the Court in a 23(b)(2) settlement will always conclude that. I could bring a 23(b)(2) pure injunction settlement hearing. Your Honor could say, "I want notice," and you're right down the middle of the plate with case law. The same is true with the right to opt out. You do not have to have them, but you can have them.

In this case, there is a right to opt out and there is direct notice. But the injunction is also a

big part of what we do. If the Court decides that we don't need a 23(b)(2) component to it, then we don't need it. It doesn't add the same effect as it does -- it doesn't change anything for class members.

What it does from a legal standpoint is it means that if class certification were contested or either sua sponte by the Court or by an objector or intervenor that the standard for certification of a 23(b)(2) settlement is different than a standard of certification of a 23(b)(3).

Now, with that said, this is clearly predominately a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement because you have a payment being made, albeit not in pennies, dollars, but in the form of the credit monitoring retail product. You have that payment being made to class members. You have a release, as modest as it is, that is your ability to bring this specific claim in a class basis again of some nature.

The Court in Berry v. LexisNexis held that the injunctive relief settlement released statutory damages, and that's not this case because here even those aren't released. If even in that case, which was much more of an imposition on class members, that the Court could certify a Rule 23(b)(2) settlement despite that there was no right to opt out and despite

that direct notice was imperfect. It was publication in that case.

It probably doesn't get us to an end point, Your Honor, but we believe it's predominately a 23(b)(3) settlement but that the Court could also certify it if it elected under Rule 23(b)(2).

THE COURT: Right. It seems a bit of a hybrid, I think.

MR. BENNETT: It does, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So certification under both would not be inappropriate in my mind, but I wanted to be clear that you weren't sort of hedging your bets because the way that your notice or your preliminary approval motion says it could be one, it could be the other. It wasn't clear to me you were seeking both.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you just indicated it's clear in your papers that there's no monetary payment, and I think you just said it was \$15, but it's for the credit monitoring.

MR. BENNETT: Correct.

THE COURT: And it's \$15 a month, right? So it's \$270 total.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's the cash

equivalent of what the consumers would be receiving.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I'm aware that there's no individual release of claim and that your firm has committed to making your number, or your firms, I guess, my apologies, have committed to making yourselves available by contact information through the notice process or otherwise?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so I guess I want to be clear, have the parties discussed representation with respect to an individual claim? Are there any potential issues there? I know that Equifax would never say you can't represent an individual claimant, but I want to be sure that we don't have any potential issues down the way that I should be aware of in any form.

MR. BENNETT: There is no secret contract.

If I can step back, the big issue in terms of Virginia ethics, which is what I live mostly by, there's no restriction on restricting yourself from solicitation.

There are restrictions, as the Court is aware, on committing not to represent people.

There is one niche, and it's really Virginia specific. It's our specific rule that if the Court

approves a prohibition on suing, and it gives an example of a mass or collective action as part of a settlement process, then we can do that. We've not agreed here.

With that said, to give the Court, at least on the record, background is all of our firms every day select who we will represent and who we will sue. Equifax, I can't understate, well, I can't overstate. I can't overstate how significant I think it is from our perspective that Equifax stepped up, acknowledged the problem, worked to resolve it, didn't like to resolve it, but did, and the effect it will have on other class members with respect to TransUnion, Experian, and getting the reports fixed.

The way that my firm, I know this is true with my colleagues as well, is when consumers contact us, we will inform them of their rights. If they have a claim, we will take that case. We will not be farming those or trying to build new cases against Equifax from these people, but when it comes in, it comes in.

But every day, Your Honor, there are cases that don't have a docket number on them where we solve their problem or obtain a cash settlement for the consumers.

From our perspective -- I mean, my understanding is that I will have shaken my colleague's hand and say that we will treat your client fairly, and well, and this is not a business venture for us here. This is not the purpose of this.

And I can tell the Court that whenever we have done, and we do it with almost all of these, when my firm is a contact point, it shuts us down when we have had large classes like this. And so we have everybody who works for me, we divide up between individual law firms, almost all our time is spent answering questions, helping people, telling them how to make disputes and the like. So we expect that we will be a really well paid, if we're effective, group of class action firms on fairness approval and Virginia's best darn pro bono firm hereafter for quite sometime. It evens out. That's part of our job as part of that big overpay if we get that way.

In this case, Your Honor, I know that doesn't answer the questions. It's sort of squishy, but it's sort of where we are. There's not a secret plan.

THE COURT: Right. Well, I just want to be sure that, you know, it does -- I can tell the amount of work that everybody has put into this settlement.

And so I'm aware that any time this kind of injunctive

relief, certainly when educated by your papers, involves a changing of what kind of information a consumer gets, I presume, without knowing, that that's a major business change and a costly one on behalf of Equifax, in this instance, because often those kinds of changes require computer system changes. That may not be the case here, and I'll ask you, Ms. Sumner, to address that. But I'm aware that when any company is involved in large collecting and disseminating large amounts of information, when you change how the information is given or taken in, it is generally costly.

So I am presuming that your settlement negotiations didn't just include what I am seeing here but a significant amount of background work about how those systems would change. And you can disabuse me of that notion.

So, really, I just want to -- I have reviewed everything that you have, and I think it is very well put together, but I want to be sure that I cover anything that may be a potential issue.

I also want to educate myself a bit. I'm aware about the *Dennis* case because you all referred to it. What is the status of the *Dennis* case?

MR. BENNETT: The Dennis case was stayed for

Spokeo and is no longer stayed.

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It is still?

MS. BRENNAN: Your Honor, it's no longer stayed. We would file a motion for class certification.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BENNETT: The firms that you see here are also now working in Dennis and vice versa. The Court has two cases, the Clark cases, with respect to Equifax's competitors. One of those with Experian. Experian wants to go to mediation as soon as we can get dates, and we are already setting dates. And the other unnamed entity thinks Spokeo is a silver bullet, and we are trying to find a way to disavow of that self confidence before too long. But I suspect in that other case, the Clark v. TransUnion case, the plan is a very rapid, as you will learn shortly, that we plan a very rapid, and the defense knows this, motion for class certification process just as Dennis handles their narrow geographic area and Clark handles ours.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BENNETT: So you won't be done with this stuff unfortunately for quite some time.

THE COURT: I just want to be clear. I know

we will deal with fees in the future, but you've suggested an amount, which is significant, and I want to be clear that you all have been careful. I guess I want to be clear that it's on the record how you all have been careful about separating fees amounts to related cases.

So I think you suggest that the amount they've agreed upon has been 2.8 million.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so I want to be sure that as you're putting that information together, that the Jenkins fees are the Jenkins fees and the Dennis fees are the Dennis fees, and that you all have been careful about that.

MR. BENNETT: We have. And we'll be even more so moving forward as we get to the fairness hearing and the motion for approval of a fee award for not just in this case, but in Dennis and in Clark, if we ever get to the stages there.

Behind the scenes, we refer to it as the Equifax-Dennis case, and it's been some time that all of our firms have been finding reps, getting reps, putting together the case, and the evidence. But I think it is fairly easy to differentiate the time spent on this.

THE COURT: I'm sure it is. I just want to be sure it's on the record, especially because you're referring to these cases as you talk to me about this one, and obviously I think some of the information overlaps what you're talking about and discovering in other issues.

All right. So I think those are the questions that I have of you, Mr. Bennett.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'd love to hear from Ms. Sumner.

MS. SUMNER: Good morning, Your Honor.

Phyllis Sumner on behalf of Equifax.

I appreciate you allowing me to appear today without Mr. Montgomery, who would normally be here as local counsel. He had a conflict today.

We did put in a lot of time and effort, as I think is clear from the papers. I would like to mention, and I think I said this to you before, obviously we have had a dispute about whether or not this conduct was a violation of the FCRA. We are talking about public records. What we would consider to be the source would be the courts or the government entity from which those records came. The dispute really was about whether or not there should be a disclosure as to the vendor that was retrieving those

records from those public sources. And, of course, here in most instances that would be LexisNexis.

Ultimately, after much discussion, both informally amongst the lawyers as well as in lengthy mediations, we agreed to essentially change an industry practice. Because, as you know, this is not Equifax alone, this impacts the way that the national credit reporting agencies report public records.

And so Equifax did step up and agree to make a change that would ultimately impact the industry in the way that this information is reported.

The company also felt in an effort to be as transparent as possible to consumers and to improve the consumer experience that it would disclose not only the source being, for example, a courthouse, but also that LexisNexis was the vendor who obtained those records.

And you're right, it is an operational change, and when we are talking about a change that potentially impacts disclosures to millions of consumers, it is not a task that goes without a lot of vetting. And Equifax does take a look at that to see if it would create other problems because oftentimes what seems like an easy solution to what appears to be a problem can create other problems. Hopefully, that

will not be the case here once this actually takes place and those consumers will receive the disclosures that have this additional information. But it was a big change for the company, and we did agree to be the first to make this change as part of this resolution, and in addition to offer to the consumers the credit monitoring product which allows them to take additional steps.

We don't believe that this is the case that ultimately would result in a lot of individual cases because we don't think it is a case where there are a lot of individual damages that would come at issue, but as part of the negotiations we agreed to separate that out and to leave that option to consumers. They will obviously receive the notifications either by email or by direct mail, and they through that process will understand what we are doing and that they have additional opportunities, if they so chose.

And I think, Your Honor, that primarily answers the questions. I did want to say that with respect to the attorneys' fees, we separately negotiated all of the aspects of the settlement agreement before even broaching that issue, and then when we discussed the fees, we also discussed that informally and through the mediation process.

So we had Judge Birch's assistance in working through that process as well, which ultimately got us to an agreement, and we are comfortable with that in terms of what is being proposed to Your Honor along those lines.

So I just wanted to make sure you're aware of that as well.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that.

I do want to just confirm with you separately, you think that approval is appropriate under both (b)(2) and (b)(3)?

MS. SUMNER: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think those are the -- yes.

MR. BENNETT: I do have one other point as I think about this, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Ms. Sumner.

MR. BENNETT: In regard to Your Honor's questions about practice restrictions, and as I'm thinking about this, I made an additional commitment to Equifax, we did, our firms, that we would not initiate a new class action against Equifax in, I guess, a roughly 12-month period. A big part of that is because of class action fatigue. Equifax -- we've

negotiated Soutter. We've negotiated settlements in a number of other cases that solved problems and paid consumers money and paid us fees. So that's to be above board. That was expressly discussed.

THE COURT: That's actually in your papers, I think. It's part of the reason I was asking about individual claims.

All right. Okay.

MS. SUMNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you all very much.

All right. Well, I have reviewed your proposed settlement class, and I do make the finding that the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable and accurate and meets the requirements of Rule 23.

This class, defined as all consumers in the United States who within two years preceding the filing of this action until the date of the preliminary approval received a credit file disclosure from Equifax containing a public record, meets the requirements under Rule 23 both ultimately (b)(2) and (b)(3).

First, with respect to the 23(a) prerequisites, it is the case that this class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The estimate is that it could be approximately

2 million individuals and that the range, as articulated today, would be 1 million to 2.5 million. Certainly the joinder or individual cases with respect to that is not practicable anywhere with respect to the number of citizens or folks who have received their credit reports are highly numerous. I think the technical term used by counsel was "gigantic." I think my children would say "ginormous," but certainly it meets the numerosity requirement under Rule 23.

The plaintiffs certainly have the requisite commonality factors. They are in receipt of a former policy and procedure or proposed former policy and procedure whereby Equifax did not identify the vendor through which it got information. It is the case, and it's clear on the record, that Equifax is not admitting that this necessarily violated FCRA, but this is a settlement that suggests that they will change their practices.

So these consumers did get a credit file disclosure from Equifax. They requested it. It was disclosed, and the vendor was not in it. So that meets both the commonality and the typicality requirements under 23(a).

Certainly with respect to adequacy, it is the case that the unity and the confidence of counsel are

certainly explained more than adequately within the paper filings. Certainly this court has seen these counsel on numerous occasions, and the class representatives not only represent the claim appropriately, but they understand and have accepted the obligations that are imposed upon them, and they have adequately represented the interests of the putative class as have the counsel who have worked with them.

I do want to ask a question which I forgot to ask. Do the named plaintiffs receive any kind of bonus payment?

MR. BENNETT: The agreement is that we can ask the Court in fairness for an amount up to \$5,000 which would be paid, of course, by Equifax.

THE COURT: That may have been in your papers. I know it's the norm, and I failed to make a note about it when reading it.

All right. So with respect to the class under 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(2), I do think that the proposed approval of both classes are appropriate in this case.

Under 23(b)(3), the common questions of law or fact predominate over questions with respect to individual members. The predominance here involves

whether Equifax failed to clearly and accurately disclose the source of the third party vendor as the source of the public records. The issue would be whether or not that failure to disclose violated FCRA and whether willfulness was involved.

So it is the case with respect to predominance, that is clearly met under 23(b)(3). The class action would be superior to any other means for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. It is the case that certainly individual lawsuits for a small statutory penalty would be costly and duplicative, but the real issue here is that the class claims outweigh the import of the individual claims with respect to what is the issue before the Court given the nature of the individual claims that would be brought.

With respect to Rule 23(b)(2), the certification would be proper if Equifax acted or failed to act in a manner that affected the class as a whole, and certification would be proper if the members of the proposed class would benefit from injunctive relief.

Again, the issue that is common to all of these millions of potential plaintiffs involve this failure to identify the vendor and whether or not that

is an issue under FCRA, and certainly this is a sea change with respect to disclosure by Equifax, and an entirely new business practice that would involve listing the name and contact information of the third party vendor on reports. I'm right about that, correct? It's not just the name. It's that the consumer can know how to contact LexisNexis.

MS. SUMNER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Which is a significant benefit with respect to what consumers would receive from Equifax. And Equifax under the proposed settlement would forward disputes regarding public record information to the vendor who supplied it. This clearly is a significant agreement reached as far as what consumers would have available to them. And while there is no direct monetary payment, there is the equivalent offer of 18 months of credit monitoring, which is worth \$270 per consumer, and there is no waiver of individual claims.

I do think this balances the risks that both parties faced with respect to potential litigation. Certainly it is the case that Equifax has not conceded the FCRA violation, and it was prepared to move forward with litigation, and there was risk to the plaintiffs especially as to damages. Because of the

causation issues, it would be difficult for plaintiffs to prove individual damages. The notice in this case is expensive, and a meaningful cash settlement, given the amount of money that would be at issue, as articulated by plaintiff's counsel here, would be difficult, if not impossible, to effectuate.

Certainly Equifax has faced the issue of whether or not it could lose a certification challenge. It could face damages at trial. And both parties face the issue of the probability of appeals, the uncertainty of outcome, and the expense of formal discovery. And it is clear that these parties have engaged in significant informal discovery given the nature of the settlement that involves a change of the business practice by a major company.

So as I look to what are commonly called the Jiffy Lube factors, the posture of the case at settlement with respect to the fairness of the outcome, there has been significant work that was conducted on the case. There is ongoing litigation elsewhere in the country which doesn't pertain to this case, but it does go to the risk factors as to both parties at issue here.

There has been a significant exchange of informal discovery, which is evident by the nature of

the settlement that is proposed. There has been a thorough investigation of facts and claims also evident via the specificity with respect that the parties represent, the number of potential plaintiffs, the type of notice that's discussed, and the outcome of the case that is proposed. There has been a series of mediations.

There has been three with Judge Birch, is that correct, or two?

MR. BENNETT: Two in person, I believe. It feels like eight, Judge.

THE COURT: That's fine. I wrote down three different dates, but there have been at least two mediations with Judge Birch, who is a retired judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and is known to this court as having extensive expertise in not just mediation but specifically this type of mediation. I'm sure he is expert in other types of mediation. But this court has individual experience with Judge Birch in consumer credit cases, and it is clear that these parties engaged a mediator who would work hard with them and require hard work of them.

The nature of the injunctive relief is groundbreaking, as articulated by both counsel here, and indicates a significant amount of work on both

sides. And the fact that there is not an individual waiver of damage claims certainly speaks volumes to the fairness of the proposed settlement whether or not Equifax believes there will be a lot of claims. It is the case that they are taking that risk. And that is the product of clearly very hard work, and counsel on both sides that are deeply experienced in this area of litigation and who do numerous consumer actions, both in this court and nationally. So the fairness is immensely evident with respect to the outcome that is proposed in this case.

With respect to the adequacy factors under the Jiffy Lube analysis, Equifax has disputed the claims from the date the case was filed and continues today to state that it's not admitting or suggesting necessarily that this is a violation of FCRA, which is one of the benefits of engaging in a class settlement. And, as indicated with respect to the risk that the parties have faced, clearly proving damages and causation is a major risk as defendants could lose certification and have to face damages to a class that is huge.

The risk of individual lawsuits, the probability of appeals, the uncertainty of the outcome and the immense cost of formal discovery all indicate

that the strength of the plaintiffs' case on the merits is strong enough and the risks are high enough that this certainly is an adequate outcome given the nature of the case.

The existence of any difficulties approved for strong defenses that plaintiffs likely would encounter if the case went to trial I think I've just addressed.

The anticipated duration and expense of additional litigation is also, I think, addressed by my comments earlier, including potential appeals and formal discovery. Obviously, any class involves two phases of litigation and possibly interlocutory appeals, all of which go toward the adequacy of the settlement that's proposed to this case.

In looking at the solvency of Equifax and the likelihood of recovery on litigated judgment, this has been addressed with respect to the nature of the size of the class here. Obviously, the potential recovery could be 200 million to 2 billion, and the papers are explicit as to the amount of money that this Equifax entity would have available to it. And the question is quite high as to whether or not they could have paid a meaningful cash settlement to a class this size. So certainly the notion of this change of

business practice and credit monitoring without a waiver of an individual claim is exactly the type of outcome the class action mechanism is meant to put forward in cases like these.

I can't really make a finding yet as to the degree of opposition to the settlement, but it is the case that individual notice will be provided, and it is an opt out class meaning that individuals can choose to opt out, and, obviously, they will have an opportunity to object under the class process.

With respect to the notice that is proposed, obviously the parties have put before me the actual notice itself. It is adequate under 23(c)(2)(b)and (e)(1) and involves direct notice. The process is detailed and specific.

Individual notice will go to each member by email or U.S. mail. Class counsel has indicated they will set up a website. They are establishing a process under which email addresses will be gathered and put forward. Having reviewed the opt out notice, I find that process sufficient also including that individuals can object.

The choice of administrator was clearly made thoughtfully. The fact that Equifax has undertaken the process of paying for the administrator is a

significant aspect of the fairness and adequacy findings that I have made, and the release that was involved in this case is narrow. So I am prepared to make the finding that this proposed settlement is fair and reasonable and accurate.

So, obviously, we need to talk about issues of scheduling the fairness hearing. Obviously, I need to appoint class counsel and approve the manner of notice, all of which I am prepared to do, and certify the settlement class.

I do need to talk to you about timeframes for the fairness hearing. I've reviewed your order. The one issue would be adding the (b)(2) to the (b)(3). That is in paragraph two of the proposed settlement order, and I guess I would need to hear from you all about other dates and information.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor. Shall I speak from here?

THE COURT: If you could approach, that would be good.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, first with respect to the date, the Court has to consider both the practical, the ability to get notice. Some will get kicked back. We will be sending new notices. There's a process to send paper mail, and then to provide an

ample opportunity for individuals to object and make their decision as they need to.

Then there's the legal concern, which under the Class Action Fairness Act requires that the Court not enter final approval on a class settlement until the relevant government authorities have been notified at least 90 days prior, which puts us to a point -- it's actually 90 days from when they receive their notice, which has already occurred, but a 90-day period from today would put us, assuming we started that today, would put us in the middle of September, which from the plaintiffs' standpoint I believe is appropriate. Ninety days is practical and it satisfies the Class Action Fairness Act, more than does, because the CAFA notice has already happened.

With respect to the order, Your Honor, we would propose the plaintiffs work with defendants to get a final proposed order back to Your Honor. We would add the date that Your Honor orders as the final fairness hearing. We would also add the class administrator that was negotiated after that paper was first drafted to paragraph 6 and the 23(b)(2) language based on Your Honor's ruling from the bench as paragraph 5(f). Those last two on page three of the proposed preliminary approval order.

My opponent might have their own issues, but that's what I would suggest.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. SUMNER: Your Honor, that's fine. I'm perfectly willing now to work with counsel to provide a revised proposed order to put that in final form. It also gives us an opportunity to look at our schedules. I feel a little hamstrung not having my cell phone with me and the ability to look at my calendar. So we could get back with you with dates.

THE COURT: All right. Please have a seat. Thank you.

I'm sorry. There is a process through which you can bring your cell phone in, and I'm sorry that we weren't clear about articulating that to you.

So I can tell you about dates that I have available in September, and then maybe you all can try to work from those.

I have a series of trials already scheduled in September. I think that I would have available September 21 and the morning of the 23rd, and I can work with you on the week of the 26th. So hopefully that's enough dates that you might be able to find some time.

MR. BENNETT: I believe so, Judge. That

should probably be fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. In October, I think the best day of the next week would be the 7th if you all have to go in to October, but you obviously can call my clerk and find out any other times, but hopefully that will be enough. All right?

Is there anything else I need to address for you all today?

MS. SUMNER: Not from the defendant, Your Honor.

MR. BENNETT: I would note that Your Honor has a George Mason, or whatever we're now calling them, law intern. But we call ourselves the Yale of Arlington. I assume that you recognize the power that a George Mason law student has. The scrappiness that we're stuck with.

THE COURT: They are young, hungry and scrappy, right? Anybody seen *Hampton* like I have?

Ms. Sumner, do you want to speak on behalf of your own school? You don't have to.

MS. SUMNER: Vanderbilt. I'm disappointed, Your Honor. There is no one here from Vanderbilt today.

THE COURT: I will say all schools here are extremely well represented, as is usually the case in

this court. So I do appreciate your time. I will tell the interns who are here that this level of hard fought and highly expert class litigation is rare around the country, and especially well done in our jurisdiction.

So what you're seeing is the upshot of a huge amount of work, and you should watch the efforts of these kinds of lawyers closely and try to emulate it.

So thank you all very much for your time. I appreciate it.

MS. SUMNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you.

(The proceedings were adjourned at 11:40 a.m.)

I, Diane J. Daffron, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/

DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR, CCR DATE